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Chapter 1
Pension Security in an Aging World
Zvi Bodie and Olivia S. Mitchell
Providing adequate retirement income for the aged population is a seri-
ous concern confronting poJicyrnakers around the world. There is much
that countries can learn from each other as they explore alternative ways
to design retirement benefit programs using a wide range of financing
methods. This volume encourages the sharing of cross-national experi-
ences by making available to a wide audience the lessons learned by prac-
titioners and analysts as they assess public and private pensions around
the world. By evaluating what pensions can do well and what they have
done poorly in both developed and developing nations, this volume also
seeks to help policy experts assess numerous suggestions for constructing
better pension institutions now and in the future.
In this introductory chapter we offer a conceptual framework for
understanding the different country experiences and policy issues ad-
dressed in this book. This framework requires evaluating the roles of the
government, employers, and individuals in providing retirement income,
and asking why some employers voluntarily sponsor pension plans for
their employees. In addition it is important to determine whether a de-
fined benefit or a defined contribution plan offers greater security to
employees, which in turn depends on employer funding and pension
investment policy. To this end we offer some thoughts on how govern-
ment regulatory policy affects pensions, focusing on tax as well as pen-
sion insurance. A brief description of the book's sections and themes
rounds out the chapter, followed by a Glossary of Terms to clarify the
pension terminology used in this chapter and throughout the volume.
Retirement Income Systems
In developed nations, the primary function of a retirement income sys-
tem is to provide people with adequate income in their old age. Prior
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TABLE 1 An International Comparison of Social Security Replacement Rates
and Pension Cover..ge
Cauntry
Australia
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Social Security
Retirement Benefit
as a Percentage
ofFinal Earnings
28 to 11
34
83 to 33
67 to 45
70 to 59
77 to 73
54
66 to 26
69 to 49
821047
50 to 26
65 to 40
Percentage
ofLaborForce
Covered
by a Pension Plan
92 (compulsory)
41
50
100 (compulsory)
42
5
50
83
90
90 (compulsory)
50
46
Source: Davis (Chapter 8, this volume), Table 3.
Note: Replacement rates given for 1992 and based on final salaries of US$ 20,OOO-US$
50,000.
to the Industrial Revolution, the extended family was the primary in-
stitution that 'performed this function. Elderly family members lived
and worked with offspring on a family-owned farm, and all drew a com-
mon livelihood from it. In many of today's less developed countries, this
family-based pattern for old age support still holds true.
Over time, urbanization and other fundamental economic and social
changes gave rise to new institutional structures for the care and support
of the elderly in much of the industrialized world. An often-used meta-
phor for describing developed countries' retirement income systems is
that of the "three-legged stool." The first leg consists of government-
provided old age assistance and insurance programs, the second is com-
prised of employer- or labor union-provided pensions, and the third is
individual and family support Uames and Villas, this volume).
There is substantial variation across households and countries in the
mix of these three components of retirement income. For instance, gov-
ernment-provided social security benefit generosity varies widely for the
countries included in Table I. That table reports the social security re-
placement rate, which is defined here as the annual government pension
benefit as a fraction offinal salary. At one extreme is Italy, where the gov-
ernment-run social security system provides a replacement rate greater
than 70 percent for workers earning a wide range of pay, Table 1 also
ZvI Bodie and Olivia S. Mitchell J
shows the proportion of the labor force covered by an occupational or
privately sponsored pension plan, and in light of the generous social
payments it is not surprising to see that in Italy only 5 percent of the labor
force is covered by a voluntarily provided occupational pension. At the
other extreme is Australia, where the social security replacement rate is
quite low but 92 percent of workers are covered by a compulsory em-
ployer-based pension plan (Davis, this volume).
A Conceptual Framework: The Life Cycle Model
Retirement income security and employer-based pensions are often de-
scribed in the context of a life cycle model of saving. In this framework,
people are posited to save during their working years so that they can
afford to consume in their non-working retirement period.' As we shall
see, pensions are only one of the many ways in which forward-looking
workers can save effectively.
Some simplifYing assumptions are useful in quickly conveying the es-
sence of the lifecycle approach. Assume for the sake of illustration that an
individual enters the labor force at age 20, works until retiring at age 65,
and dies at age 80. During the working years, this person earns a constant
real labor earnings, a portion of which is saved for retirement. These
savings are deposited in a fund that earns a zero real rate of interest. At
retirement, a constant real retirement benefit is paid, structured such
that at death the retirement fund is completely depleted. We further
assume that the individual saves an amount during the working years
sufficient to provide the same level of real consumption before and after
retirement.
Figure I depicts the profiles of earnings and consumption just de-
scribed. The two shaded areas represent, respectively, total accumulated
savings during the working years and total accumulated retirement bene-
fits. Absent any net subsidies to the household (and assuming away any
bequest motive for the moment), these two areas must be equal for the
lifetime consumption plan to be feasible. The equality of these two areas
implies that the ratio of consumption over earnings must equal the ratio
ofyears ofwork to total years ofwork and retirement. In other words ifwe
define the replacement rate as the ratio of consumption to earnings, this
can be derived as follows:
Years ofwork * (Earnings - Consumption) = Years of retirement * Consumption
Years ofwork * Earnings = (Years ofwork + Years of retirement) * Consumption
Replacement = Consumption = Years ofwork
rate Earnings Years ofwork + Years of retirement
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Figure I. Life cycle earnings and consumption profiles.
In this example, there are 45 years ofwork and 15 years of retirement, so
the replacement rate is equal to 45/60 or 75 percent.
In this example the individual's total or "gross" saving during his or
her working years, and the benefits thus generated during retirement,
may be divided into .three components depending on the institution or
provider controlling the fund: government, employer, and individual.
The government component of gross saving consists of social security
taxes paid by the individual and the employer. The pension compo-
nent of gross saving that goes to the employer's pension plan is the
employee's own contribution, plus the employer'S contribution, which is
also thought of as the cash compensation foregone to qualify for the
future pension benefits. Any residual saving needs must be met by the
individual accumulating private assets (e.g., housing, equities).
In the next few sections we explain why these three different compo-
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nents of retirement savings arise, and what the role of each may be in the
life cycle savings plan.
The Role of the Government in Retirement
Income Provision
The role of the government in retirement income provision varies con-
siderably across countries." Despite obvious cross-national differences in
the government's role, many of which are outlined in the chapter by
Estelle James and Dimitri Vittas, there remains a common theme: in vir-
tually every country the government provides a "floor" of income protec-
tion for the elderly, with the aged population's needs met by some mix of
national insurance and national welfare systems, in the form of cash and
medical insurance. This floor (or "safety net") is usually mandatory and
non-assignable.
Several economicjustifications are offered for government provision of
a layer of retirement benefits for everyone. These include the followingS:
Informational Inefficiencies
It is costly to acquire the knowledge necessary to prepare and carry out
long-run plans for income provision. Although people's lifetime finan-
cial plans depend on their individual preferences and opportunities,
their goals may be similar enough such that a standard retirement savings
plan can prove suitable to many. By providing a basic plan that supplies at
least a minimum level ofold age support, the government is likely to help
everyone save more efficiently than they could on their own.
Adverse Selection Problems
Because one's date ofdeath is not known with certainty, there is consid-
erable risk that people will outlive their retirement savings in contrast to
the simplest version of the life cycle model. One way to insure against the
risk of exhausting one's savings during retirement is by purchasing a life
annuity contract. But the private market for life annuities suffers from
adverse selection, since people with a higher than average life expectancy
have a high demand for this kind of insurance. As a consequence, an
average individual will find the equilibrium price for privately purchased
life annuities unattractive, and will tend to self-insure against longevity
risk by providing an extra reserve of retirement savings.4 Universal and
mandatory social security is one way ofovercoming this adverse selection
problem. By making participation in the national plan mandatory, and by
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restricting benefit payouts to the form of life annuities, the social cost of
adverse selection is greatly reduced.
Free-Rider Problems
An alternative rationale for a government-mandated universal retire-
ment income system is to address the free rider problem, which arises
when the citizenry collectively feels an obligation to offer a "safety net"
for everyone living in the society. As a consequence, there emerges a de
facto promise to provide a tax-funded "safety net" or minimum benefit
even when no formal provision is made for one. If this collective commit-
ment is well understood by all, some people might avoid saving for their
own retirement, intending instead to rely on tax-funded benefits when
old. Similarly, some might take on more risk in investing their retirement
savings than they would in the absence ofa safety net. In such an environ-
ment, mandating universal participation simply forces people to pre-pay
for benefits they ultimately will receive from the system. Therefore the
purpose of a mandatory system is to protect society against free riders.
While these arguments offer a rationale for why governments might
believe it important to mandate a minimum level of universal participa-
tion in a national retirement program, they are silent about what the
particular level of government benefits should be. These arguments are
also silent on whether the government might stop after mandating a
plan, leaving it to the private sector to manage the plan once it is man-
dated. For example, in several countries the other two legs of the retire-
ment income stool are encouraged by government regulation as an alter-
native to government provision. As Andrew Dilnot shows (this volume),
governments often use tax policy to provide incentives for employers and
unions to sponsor pension plans that -like the government-run plan-
are mandatory and non-assignable. In some of those countries, tax incen-
tives are also given to self-employed individuals and households (who are
not otherwise covered) to create a retirement fund for themselves. Use of
such funds for other purposes is discouraged by imposing penalties on
early withdrawal of money from the fund.
The Role of Employers in Retirement Saving
Pension plans sponsored by employers or unions are often integrated
with the government-run plan, either explicitly or implicitly.s When com-
bined with the government-provided retirement benefit, these plans are
usually designed to replace 70 to 100 percent of pre-retirement earnings
of lower and middle income employees in developed nations. Benefits
are usually lower for higher-income workers, who must rely on direct
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personal savings for a larger part of their retirement income. In this
section we examine the motivations for and effects of employer-based
pension plans.
Why are employers and/ or trade unions logical sponsors ofretirement
plans for their employees? There are at least four good reasons:
Efficient Lab(ff Contracting
Pension plans are an important incentive device in labor contracts,
affecting employee hiring and turnover patterns, work effort, and the
timing of retirement.
Inf017TUltional Efficiencies
Employment-based plan sponsors often have better access than the
plan beneficiaries to informatio'n needed for preparing long-run finan-
cial plans tailored to the needs of the employees. In particular, sponsors
may have better knowledge of the probable path of future labor income
for their employees. By providing a basic plan that saves enough to pro-
vide for replacement of anticipated future labor earnings, the corporate
sponsor can potentially save more efficiently than each employee acting
individually. In order for the sponsor to provide efficiently for future
wage and salary replacement of employees, it is enough to have accurate
forecasts of the earnings of the group as a whole and not the individual
earnings ofeach member of the group. It is probably easier (although by
no means simple) to forecast group earnings than it is to forecast an
individual's future earnings.
Principal-Agent Problems
While plan sponsors and beneficiaries may have conflicting economic
interests, in many respects their interests coincide. Employers who ac-
quire a reputation for taking care of their employees' retirement needs
may find it easier to recruit and retain higher quality employees. If em-
ployees' trust and good will toward the employer develop, then motiva-
tion and labor productivity may be enhanced. Employers therefore have
some economic incentive to act in the best interests of their employees.
Other possible providers of retirement planning services may be less
suitable as beneficial agents of the employee. Insurance agents, stock
brokers, and others who are often engaged in providing these services to
individual households may be less trustworthy than an employer because
they may be interested in selling the individual some product or service
that the individual might not choose were he or she well-informed. These
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other agents may be motivated to persuade the individual to save too
much for retirement or to invest in inappropriate ways. Anyone who has
ever tried to find competent and impartial personal financial planning or
investment advice is aware of the difficulties.
Access to Capital Markets
Plan sponsors often have access to capital markets that is unavailable to
their employees acting as individual savers. A risk faced by an individual
employee may be uninsurable directly through the capital markets, but it
may be insurable through the employer. In addition, scale economies can
be gleaned by large investors where small savers cannot. Ofcourse, finan-
cial intermediaries such as insurance companies often can provide a
suitable vehicle for the insurance needs of employees. But often a finan-
cial intermediary will not be willing to provide enough of the insurance
desired by the individual at an efficient price because of problems of
adverse selection and moral hazard.
Longevity insurance is an important example of this. In principle,
longevity risk is to a large extent diversifiable and can be largely elimi-
nated through risk pooling and sharing. But, as described earlier, the
problem of adverse selection can make the private insurance market for
life annuities inefficient. Group insurance through pension plans is often
seen as a solution to this problem.
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution
Pension Plans
In order to investigate aspects of pension plans more fully it is useful to
define a few terms. Pension plans are then described in terms of "who,"
"when," and "how much" is promised in benefits and how much in the
way of contributions is required to sustain the plans.
In the nations that are the focus of analysis in this book, we follow
convention in describing two polar types of pension plans: defined con-
tribution and defined benefit plans. In a defined contribution plan, a
formula specifies the amount of money that must be contributed to the
plan, but not benefit payouts. Contribution rules usually are a predeter-
mined fraction ofsalary (e.g., the employer contributes 10 percent of the
employee's annual wages to the plan), although that fraction need not be
constant over an employee's career. The pension fund consists of a set of
individual investment accounts, one for each covered employee. Pension
benefits are not specified, other than that at retirement the employee
gains access to the total accumulated value ofcontributions and earnings
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on those contributions. These funds can be used to purchase an annuity,
or become accessible as a lump sum.
In a defined contribution plan, the participating employee frequently
has some choice over both the level of contributions and the way the
account is invested. In principle, contributions could be invested in any
security, although in practice most plans limit investment choices to
bond, stock, and money market funds. The employee bears all the invest-
ment risk; the retirement account is, by definition, fully funded by the
contributions, and the employer has no legal obligation beyond making
its periodic contributions. Investment policy for defined contribution
assets is essentially the same as for any tax-qualified individual retirement
account. Indeed, the main providers of investment products for these
plans are the mutual funds and insurance companies that also serve the
general investment needs of individuals. Therefore in a defined contri-
bution plan much of the task of setting and achieving retirement income
replacement goals falls on the employee.
In a defined benefit plan, by con trast, the pension plan specifies for-
mulas for the cash benefits to be paid after retirement. The benefit for-
mula typically takes into account years of service for the employer and
level of wages or salary (e.g., the employer pays a retired worker an
annuity from retirement to death, the amount ofwhich might be equal to
one percent of the employee's final annual earnings multiplied by years
of service). Contribution amounts are not specified, and the employer
(called the "plan sponsor") or an insurance company hired by the spon-
sor guarantees the benefits and thus absorbs the investment risk. The
obligation of the plan sponsor to pay the promised benefits is similar to a
long-term debt liability of the employer.
As measured either by number of plan participants or total assets, the
defined benefit form of pensions dominates in most countries around
the world. This is so in the United States, although the trend since the
mid-I970s is for sponsors to select the defined contribution form when
starting new plans. But the two plan types are not mutually exclusive.
Many sponsors adopt defined benefit plans as a "primary" plan, in which
participation is mandatory, and supplement them with voluntary defined
contribution plans. Moreover, there are some plan designs that are "hy-
brids" combining features of both plan types. For example, in a "cash
balance" plan each employee has an individual account that accumulates
interest. Each year, employees are told how much they have accumulated
in their account, and if they leave the firm, they can take that amount
with them. If they stay until retirement age, however, they receive an
annuity determined by the plan's benefit formula. A variation on this
design is a "floor" plan, which is a defined contribution plan with a
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guaranteed minimum retirement annuity determined by a defined bene-
fit formula. These plan designs usually take into account the benefits
provided hy the government-run system.
From the employee perspective, the major advantage of the defined
benefit approach is that it offers plan participants who stay with the same
employer a guaranteed benefit designed to replace their pre-retirement
labor income. The main defect of private defined benefit plans in most
countries is that they do not currently offer explicit inflation insurance.
The major advantages of the defined contribution approach are that it
offers participants a more portable and flexible retirement savings vehi-
cle whose value during the pre-retirement years is easier to understand
and measure. In addition some employees see the cash-out access to the
defined contribution plan's lump sum accumulation to be attractive.
Hybrid pension plans, such as cash-balance or floor plans, are often de-
signed to combine the best features ofboth "pure" types.
When Are Private Pension Plans Funded?
In the present context, we use the term "pension fund" to represent
the cumulation of assets created from contributions and the investment
earnings on those contributions, less any payments of benefits from the
fund. 6 The pension plan is the contractual arrangement setting out the
rights and obligations of all parties; the fund is a separate pool of assets
set aside to provide collateral for the promised benefits. In defined con-
tribution plans, the value of the benefits equals that of the assets and so
the plan is always exactly fully funded. But in defined benefit plans, there
is a continuum of possibilities. There may be no assets dedicated to the
pension plan in a separate fund, in which case the plan is said to be
unfunded. When a separate fund exists but assets are worth less than the
present value of the promised benefits, the plan is underfunded. And if
the plan's assets have a market value that exceeds the present value of the
plan's liabilities, it is said to be overfunded.
Why and how does funding matter? The assets in a pension fund pro-
vide collateral for the benefits promised to the pension plan beneficia-
ries. A useful' analogy is that of an equipment trust. In an equipment
trust, such as one set up by an airline to finance the purchase of air-
planes, the trust assets serve as specific collateral for the associated debt
obligation. The borrowing firm's legal liability, however, is not limited to
the value of the collateral. By the same token, if the value of the assets
serving as collateral exceeds the amount required to settle the debt obli-
gation, any excess reverts to the borrowing firm's shareholders. So, for
instance, if the market value of the equipment were to double, this would
greatly increase the security of the promised payments, but it would not
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increase their size. The residual increase in value accrues to the share-
holders of the borrowing firm.
The relation among the shareholders of the firm sponsoring a pension
plan, the pension fund, and the plan beneficiaries is similar to the rela-
tion among the shareholders of the borrowing firm in an equipment
trust, the equipment serving as collateral, and the equipment-trust lend-
ers. In both cases, the assets serving as collateral are "encumbered" (i.e.,
the firm is not free to use them for any other purpose as long as that
liability remains outstanding), and the liability of the firm is not limited
to the specific collateral. Any residual or "excess" ofassets over promised
payments belongs to the shareholders of the sponsoring firm. Thus, the
greater the funding, the more secure the promised benefits. However,
whether the plan is underfunded, fully funded, or overfunded, the size of
the promised benefits does not change.
Why do employers fund their defined benefit plans? Reasons appear to
vary across countries. First, funding offers benefit security if there is no
government insurance of pension benefits, or only partial insurance.
Employees may demand that the future pension promises made to them
by their employer be collateralized through a pension fund (Mitchell and
Smith, 1994). In the United Kingdom, for example, there is no govern-
ment pension insurance beyond the minimum guaranteed pension of
the State Earnings Related Pension scheme (SERPs). Pension funding in
this case provides an important cushion of safety for retirement income
(Daykin this volume).
Second, some countries impose minimum funding standards by law.
These standards seek to insure that promised pension benefits are paid
even in the event of default by the corporate sponsor, and also aim to
protect the government (and the taxpayer) from abuse of government-
supplied pension insurance. In the United States, for example, a govern-
ment pension insurance group called the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration (PBGC) must continue pension payments offered by defined
benefit pension plans even if their sponsoring corporations become
bankrupt with an underfunded pension plan. Recent changes in United
States pension law have required that the PBGC insurance premium
must depend on the plan's extent of underfunding, and have also elimi-
nated the possibility of voluntary termination of an underfunded pen-
sion plan (Ippolito 1989; UtgoffI992). In Canada, pension insurance was
offered only by a single province for a limited number ofyears (Pesando,
this volume).
Third, there may be tax incentives for plan sponsors to fund their
defined benefit plans. As Dilnot (this volume) notes, the tax advantage to
pension funding in the United States and the United Kingdom stems
from the ability of the sponsor to earn the pre-tax interest rate on pen-
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sion invesunents. It is no accident that in Germany, where employers face
a tax disadvantage if they fund their pension plan, pensions are predomi-
nantly unfunded (Ahrend, this volume).
Finally, funding a pension plan may provide the sponsoring firm with
financial "slack" that can be used in case of financial difficulties the firm
may face in the future (Bodie et al. 1987). In the United States, pension
law allows plan sponsors facing financial distress to draw upon excess
pension assets by reduced funding or, in the extreme case, voluntary plan
termination. The pension fund therefore effectively serves as a tax-shel-
tered contingency fund for the firm.
Inflation and the Adequacy of Pension Funding
For the purposes of measuring funding adequacy, it is critical to consider
the extent to which defined benefit pension promises are protected
against inflation. There is considerable controversy among pension pro-
fessionals in the academic and business worlds about whether it is appro-
priate to view pension promises as fixed in nominal or real terms. The
resolution of this issue determines one's view of the adequacy of pension
funding and of the appropriate way for a plan sponsor to hedge the
liability.
As previously described, in a defined benefit plan a retiree's pension
benefit amount is determined by a formula that takes into account the
employee's history ofservice and wages or salary. Under the terms of the
defined benefit promise, the plan sponsor is required to provide this
benefit regardless of the invesunent performance of the pension fund
assets. As a consequence, the benefit annuity promised to the employee is
the employer's liability. What is the nature of this liability?
To answer this question, one matter that must be confronted is whether
promised benefits are protected from inflation at least until the worker
retires. Many believe that final-pay retirement benefit formulas, for in-
stance, offer indexation inasmuch as earnings track inflation. But this is a
misperception in many countries. In the United States, for instance, so-
cial security benefit payments at retirement are indexed to a general wage
series, but pension benefits even in final-pay private sector plans are
"indexed" only to the extent that (1) the employee continues to work for
the same employer; (2) the employee's own wage or salary keeps pace
with the general index; and (3) the employer continues to maintain the
same plan. In the past few decades these three conditions have not gener-
ally held: turnover and plant downsizing have been significant for older
workers; real wages have fallen on average; and pension plans have been
altered quite frequently over time.?
A related concern is that few private sector defined benefit pension
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plans offer an explicitly inflation-protected benefit under the plan's for-
mula. However, many plan sponsors in the United States have from time
to time provided voluntary increases in benefits to their retired employ-
ees, depending on the financial condition of the sponsor and the in-
crease in the living costs of retirees (Clark 1990; Gustman and Steinmeier
1993). Some observers have interpreted such increases as evidence of
implicit cost of living indexation (Ippolito 1986). These voluntary ad hoc
benefit increases, however, are very different from a formal COlA (cost
ofliving adjustment).
The difference between indexed and non-indexed benefits emerges
quite clearly in comparing the way inflation protection of accrued pen-
sion benefits is treated in different countries. In the United States, the
plan sponsor is under no legal obligation to pay more than the amount
explicitly accrued under the plan's benefit formula. Since very few U.S.
employers offer pension benefits automatically indexed for inflation, this
lack of inflation indexation gives rise to the portability problem. Workers
who change jobs wind up with lower pension benefits at retirement than
otherwise identical workers who stay with the same employer, even if the
employers have DB (defined benefit) plans with the same final-pay bene-
fit formula. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, accrued benefits are
indexed to the cost of living up to the age of retirement (subject to a 5
percent per year cap). Thus even a terminated employee has indexation
for general inflation up to retirement age, as long as his or her benefit is
vested (Daykin, this volume).
Insuring Private Pensions
A major putative advantage of a defined benefit pension plan over a
defined contribution plan is that it protects the employee against invest-
ment risk.s The economic efficiency of this protection against investment
risk is enhanced by the provision of guarantees against default risk. To
understand the social welfare gains from guarantees of pension annu-
ities, it is critical to distinguish between employees and investors (stock-
holders and bondholders) in firms that provide pension annuities. The
distinction is that, unlike the firm's investors, the employees holding the
sponsor's pension liabilities strictly prefer to have the payoffs on their
contracts as insensitive as possible to the default risk of the firm itself.
The function served by a pension annuity is for the beneficiaries to re-
ceive a specified benefit upon retirement. That function is less efficiently
performed if the contract instead calls for the benefit to be paid in the
joint event that the employee retires and the firm is still solvent.9
Even if the sponsoring firm offers an actuarially fair increase in the em-
ployee's cash wages to reflect the risk of insolvency, it is still likely that an
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employee might prefer a pension annuity with the least default risk. Em-
ployees typically have a large non-diversified stake in the firm already.lO
They may have invested in firm-specific human capital, which loses value
if the firm does poorly. Thus, few employees would consciously agree to
accept default risk on their pension benefits in order to increase their
expected cash wages. This is true even when the employee has all the
relevant information necessary to assess the default risk of the firm. In
most cases, the employees do not have the relevant information, and this
fact makes the welfare loss even greater.
For example, consider the profile of a "typical" defined benefit plan
beneficiary. The vast majority of those covered by PBGC guarantees in
the United States are blue collar and white collar workers for whom
pension benefits constitute a large portion of total retirement savings.
These employees are very unlikely to have asset portfolios of sufficient
size or the investment expertise necessary to hedge the non-diversifiable
risks of their defined benefit pension asset. Only the most highly com-
pensated managerial employees of the firm might have the financial
wealth and knowledge required to diversify away the risks of their defined
benefit pension claims. But to hedge this risk, they would effectively have
to take a short position in the sponsoring firm's equity. Typically, man-
agers and employees are prohibited from shortselling the firm's securi-
ties by the provisions of their incentive compensation package.
In contrast, an investor in the stocks or bonds issued by the sponsoring
firm is explicitly taking an interest in the fortunes of the firm itself. The
function of these securities is to allow investors to participate in the risk
and return prospects of the firm. Investors can diversify away much of the
default risk associated with anyone specific firm as part of their total
portfolios. Employees with a substantial part of their wealth in firm-
specific defined benefit pension annuities usually cannot achieve such
optimal diversification. They are like investors who are constrained to
hold a large fraction of their wealth in the form of long-term bonds
issued by a single firm, which is also their employer. ll Thus, both their
tangible and human capital are significantly exposed to the fortunes of a
single firm.
The above reasoning establishes a rationale for insuring defined bene-
fit pensions against the risk that the plan sponsor will default on its
promise to provide benefits. It does not establish a rationale for the
government to provide such insurance. Indeed,James Pesando's analysis
(this volume) of the pension systems in several developed countries re-
veals that the number of governments that provide such insurance is
remarkably limited.
Whether or not a national government offers pension insurance, there
is a case for government oversight. If a significant part of the private
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pension system failed to deliver the benefits promised to millions of
people who had relied on those benefits for their retirement security, the
government would surely step in to provide at least some of those bene-
fits. Thus, even in the absence of a formal system of pension insurance,
the government is the de facto "guarantor oflast resort."
Pension Investment Policy and Benefit Security
As already stated, in a defined contribution pension plan the benefici-
ary's retirement income depends directly on the performance of the
assets in the fund. J2 The employee bears the entire investment risk; the
retirement account is, by definition, fully funded by the contributions,
and the employer has no legal obligation beyond making its periodic
contributions. For defined contribution plans, investment policy consid-
erations are essentially the same as for a tax-qualified individual retire-
ment account: a trade-<>ffbetween risk and expected return.
In a defined benefit plan, the sponsor's investment policy does not, in
general, affect the retirement benefits received by the plan's beneficia-
ries. For well-funded plans or for plans sponsored by financially healthy
employers, the promised benefits are paid regardless of the pension
fund's investment performance. Nevertheless, investment performance
in defined benefit plans can affect benefit payments if the plan sponsor
defaults with inadequate assets to cover promised benefits, and govern-
ment insurance is insufficient to cover all the resulting shortfall (i.e., the
insured benefits are capped at some level).
Even for defined benefit plans that have fully funded the entire benefit
promise, investment policy can matter if the sponsor pursues any policy
other than strict "matching" ofassets to the plan's liabilities to the benefi-
ciaries. For example, for pension funds that invest heavily in equity se-
curities, a funding shortfall can quickly develop if interest rates decline
(thus increasing the present value of promised benefits) or if stock prices
fall precipitously. If a funding shortfall is not subsequently covered by
either the plan sponsor or the government insurer, then some of the
promised benefits will not be paid.
Funding of Pensions in the Public Sector
In a strictly unfunded pay-as-you-go government-<>perated pension sys-
tem, retirees' benefits depend entirely on the stream of revenue gener-
ated by taxes levied on currently active workers. If this were exactly true,
benefits would fluctuate with changes in economic fortunes, rising when
tax collections rise and falling in recessions. In practice this does not
happen in lock-step, since most government pensions are of the defined
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benefit variety and promise to deliver retirement benefits according to a
specified benefit formula. Nevertheless, without funding, benefit payouts
are susceptible to cuts when the public sector experiences a rising ratio of
retired to active workers and/or large government deficits. In this event
benefits accrued under that formula may be altered as a way of reducing
this form ofgovernment debt.
As a case in point, consider the 1983 reform of the United States social
security system. A changing demographic structure for workers led many
to become concerned that there could be dramatically reduced benefits
in the future in a pure pay-as-you-go system. Hence, a key provision of
that reform was to require substantial pre-funding of future benefits. To
do this, the social security payroll tax rate was raised and the excess of
current revenues over current benefit payments was invested in govern-
ment bonds held in a trust fund.
While this reform apparently funds the plan, some are less sure about
the result. In a private plan, funding is used to insure against default by
the plan sponsor. Under social security, the promise to pay benefits seem-
ingly has the same level of full faith and credit of the government as the
bonds used to fund the plan. Yet there seems to be a belief that pre-
funding will ensure that, when workers reach retirement, they will indeed
receive benefits approximating those promised under the current bene-
fit formula (i.e., the one in effect when they were active in the labor
force).
A problem with this view is that there remains a potential risk associ-
ated with benefits promised under a government-run retirement income
system. Even if those currently in the government are committed to
maintaining the current schedule of promised benefits, they cannot
credibly fully bind future governments to do so. This arises from a para-
dox of power: the government is too powerful to bind itself credibly to
any set of existing rules (Diamond 1993). Indeed, it has become evident
in many countries that that benefit formula and the method of financing
those benefits can be and often is changed. In the United States, for
example, the Congress has changed both in the past and it can surely do
so again in the future. In Europe benefit promises have been eroded by
inflation to the -same end (Turner and Rajnes, this volume), and perhaps
more strikingly, public pensions in Chile were recently radically restruc-
tured, replacing the defined benefit public social security system with a
mainly private defined contribution plan (Myers 1992).
Another example that highlights the importance of funding in secur-
ing promised pension benefits in government-run plans is the case of
underfunded state and local government retirement plans in the United
States (Mitchell and Smith 1994). In more than one instance, firefight-
ers, police officers, and other public employees have been required to
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defer or even forgo a portion of the retirement benefits they had been
promised because taxpayers were unwilling to shoulder the financial bur-
den they impose. Had these plans been fully funded as pension benefits
were accruing, it is doubtful that these public employees would now be
asked to forego any of their pension benefits. 13
These examples bring out an important difference between govern-
ment and private sector obligations. A private sector plan sponsor cannot
unilaterally repudiate its legal liability to make promised payments. It can
default because of inability to pay, but it cannot repudiate its legal obliga-
tions without penalty. On the other hand, a government - because it has
the power to legislate changes in the law-can sometimes find ways to
repudiate such obligations without immediate and obvious penalty. In-
deed, an integrated system in which private plan sponsors supplement
government-provided pension benefits to achieve a promised "replace-
ment ratio" of pre-retirement earnings can be seen as a type of private-
sector insurance against the political risks of the government-run system
(Merton, Bodie, and Marcus 1987; Myers 1977).
In sum, a mixed public-private system of retirement income provision
is a way of reducing the risks of each separate component through diver-
sification across providers. Public sector pension plans can change the
law to reduce promised benefit levels. Private sector pension plan spon-
sors are committed by law (and perhaps reputation) to pay promised
benefits, but they may default. And sometimes, as an additional linkage
reinforcing the first two legs of the retirement income stool, the govern-
ment may insure private pension benefits against the risk ofdefault.
Overview of the Volume
Before turning to this book's individual contributions, the reader may
find useful an overview of the volume and its parts. The chapters are
divided into three sections, with the first set of studies devoted to pen-
sions in developed nations; the second focusing on pension issues in
developing countries; and the final section unitying the discussion by
concentrating on regulatory issues affecting pensions the world over. We
discuss each in turn.
Policyrnakers in developed countries sense rising concern about old-
age retirement income security, particularly in the light of aging trends
and overstressed government budgets which undermine retirement in-
come programs. Nowhere is this more evident than in the United King-
dom, where a pension investment scandal focused awareness on severe
British pension problems. In Chapter 2, the United Kingdom's Chief
Actuary Christopher Daykin begins with an unusually clear statement of
the complex British multiple-tier pension system. For the first tier the
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national government guarantees a modest flat rate indexed benefit, on
top of which employees may join either a state-provided earnings-based
pension system or a private system. The private system includes two op-
tions, either an employer-sponsored pension (if a firm has "contracted
out" from the government second-tier) ,or a personal pension plan. Most
of the private pensions are of the defined benefit variety.
As Daykin shows, coverage by group pensions is very high among em-
ployees of large organizations, and contracting out is extremely popular.
Nevertheless, there is no common regulatory framework governing these
pensions, there are few legal requirements concerning the responsibil-
ities and authority of trustees, and funding as well as reporting require-
ments are rather relaxed by United States standards. In addition, pension
plan liabilities in Britain are not formally insured, though in the event of
company bankruptcy, a pension plan has the option to buy back workers'
rights in the state-guaranteed earnings-based system. While this multiple-
pillar arrangement has some strengths, it also suffers from some impor-
tant vulnerabilities. Many of these are the subject of current efforts to
reform the British pension system identified by Daykin, but as he points
out, some of the important risks remain less than fully insured. Daykin
also raises other salient issues in this chapter regarding the future of pen-
sions, including mobile employees' desires to maintain pension mem-
bership as the European Community relaxes migration barriers. In his
commentary on this work, Anthony M. Santomero raises additional ques-
tions about whether current redesign efforts will go far enough to secure
private pensions in that nation.
Common themes are sounded in a companion chapter about occupa-
tional pensions in Germany by Peter Ahrend, a German benefits attor-
ney. As in the United Kingdom, in Germany a national social security
system underlies an employer-sponsored second tier. Most unusual to
pension experts from other nations is the German practice of holding
only "book reserves" in a pension fund, which means that retiree benefit
payments depend entirely on the sponsoring company's assets. Since
there is no separate trust fund established for pension accumulations,
the pension promise represents a long-term claim against the corporate
balance sheet, and the sponsoring company is allowed to defer its taxes
by virtue of these book reserves.
Ahrend goes on to describe a German mutual insurance arrangement
covering guaranteed vested benefits and retiree benefits after age 60 in
the event of company bankruptcy; this arrangement, first established in
1974, is operated on a pay-as-you-go basis and is backstopped by a federal
bank. While the arrangement has apparently worked fairly well thus far,
the pension system is facing new threats of late, including the fact that
employment has not grown quickly in the last decade, the population is
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aging, and many pension plans are "closed" to new entrants. In addition,
recent European Court of Justice cases have held that men must be
permitted to retire as early as women. All these changes may further
challenge the plans' health.
In her assessment of the German pension system, Lucy apRoberts ar-
gues that differences in tax structures as well as labor-management rela-
tions may explain why German pensions are completely invested in the
sponsoring company, while United States pensions are more diversified.
In Germany as well as in France, employees frequently have a stronger say
in corporate management than in the United States. Marc Twinney dis-
cusses factors militating change in pensions worldwide, and finds some
lessons for German pensions as well as those in North America. In par-
ticular he argues that pre-funding pension obligations is likely to become
more common, particularly as international companies are judged in
terms of their credit ratings. He also warns that pension accounting
practices for many German firms do not meet accounting and valuation
standards demanded by international capital markets.
In the final chapter on developed country pensions, the state of pen-
sions in Japan is discussed by Noriyasu Watanabe, a Japanese pension
expert. He notes that social security in Japan was recently restructured
into two components, a flat benefit plus an earnings-related segment and
a supplementary private plan. Nevertheless, the rapid aging ofJapan's
population has prompted the government to predict payroll tax rates of
35 percent by the year 2025, in order to preserve promised (pay-as-you-
go) benefits payable at age 60. Private defined benefit pension plans
developed after World War II under a regulatory structure allowing book
reserves as in Germany; in these plans, most benefits are payable as siz-
able lump sum benefits (about US$ 200,000 at retirement).
Three interrelated and very deep-seated challenges are identified as
key to the future development of pensions in Japan. First, as Watanabe
says, "good accounting rules for pension systems have not yet been estab-
lished." This leads to the second problem: employees fuil to understand
their exposure to pension risk and their lack of legal recourse in the
event of company failure. Finally, financial and insurance markets are
facing deregulation in Japan, leading to increased competition among
institutions managing the funds. In his commentary on this chapter,
Robert Clark broadens the discussion to include challenges to the Japa-
nese retirement system wrought by rapid population aging and low man-
datory retirement ages. Indeed, many developed nations would be well
served by studying how the Japanese adapt their pensions to the new
social and economic environment, inasmuch as that nation's population
is aging more rapidly than the population in most other OECD countries.
The second section of this volume carries on some of the themes devel-
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oped in the first, and shows clearly that retirement policy in emerging
economies confronts many of the same problems as in developed na-
tions. This is somewhat ironic, because development specialists for the
past several decades have sought to solve the most immediate problems
facing poor countries-widespread morbidity and mortality, insufficient
food production, and inadequate jobs for the working-age population-
only to find that their successes imply the burden ofan increasingly aging
population.
These phenomena, and how pensions can respond to such massive
socioeconomic changes, are taken up in the chapter by EstelleJames and
Dimitri Vittas from the World Bank. These authors review a range of
nationally mandated provident funds beginning with Malaysia's, estab-
lished in 1951, and others in Asia and Mrica. Most recently, in 1981, Chile
replaced its national, unfunded, social security system with a mandated
privately managed, defined contribution plan into which 10 percent of
pay must be contributed. Many development experts attribute at least
some of Chile's economic boom over the last fifteen years to the rapid
growth of the pension system, including the rapid deepening of the
capital market and excellent rates of return. Nevertheless this purely
private system potentially limits the flexibility with which governments
can exercise fiscal and monetary policy, tends to produce high admin-
istrative costs, and does not guarantee a minimum income to retirees.
Partial answers to these issues are offered by the authors.
Two sets of commentaries provide an interesting counterpoint to this
chapter. Alan Auerbach emphasizes the risks associated with mandated
savings schemes and is skeptical that they can be used either to redis-
tribute income or to generate "cheap capital." Donald S. Grubbs agrees
that forced savings systems are needed when employees are too short-
sighted to make provision for themselves, but argues that a government-
run system that invests in private assets may potentially be more cost
effective than the Chilean model. In any event, he holds that a universal
defined benefit plan is needed to guarantee a floor of retirement in-
come, a floor that a defined benefit contribution plan does not promise.
Conditions are somewhat more primitive elsewhere in the developing
world. AsJohn·A. Turner, pension specialist from the United States De-
partment of Labor, points out, the countries of central and eastern Eu-
rope confront a particularly difficult set of issues in contemplating re-
tirement policy and the role pensions can play. Turner and colleague
David M. Rajnes review several economic preconditions needed to set up
pensions, and point out that both Hungary and the Czech Republic have
experienced grave difficulties investing in foreign securities inasmuch
as they lack foreign exchange. Ownership of domestic assets is made
difficult by the slow pace of privatization, though in Slovakia, for in-
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stance, workers have gained shares in jointly held Investment Privatiza-
tion Funds. Of course inflation is an ever present worry threatening real
returns, made worse by bankrupt social security systems, confusion over
property rights, and lack of regulation regarding financial malfeasance.
Lessons of the British, the German, and ofcourse the Chilean models are
assessed with regards to the feasibility of their applicability in these Euro-
pean nations.
The third and final section of this volume examines the main ways in
which governments mold the private pension environment. The policies
deemed most important in the present context are (1) taxation of pen-
sion contributions and benefits, (2) regulation of pension financing, and
(3) pension insurance. Many countries make a formal stance on these
policy issues, often explicitly as part ofa coordinated approach to encour-
aging retirement saving, while other times they act implicitly. But as the
analysis chapters demonstrate, these three government policies pro-
foundly influence the shape and strength of the pension institution in all
nations.
In a very useful analysis Andrew Dilnot of the Institute for Fiscal Stud-
ies offers a taxonomy to be used in thinking about how governments tax
pension plans. He notes that taxes may be levied at one of three points:
when contributions are made, when plan assets earn income, and when
benefits are received. In the United States, for instance, the government
(more or less) allows tax-protected contributions and inside buildup but
taxes pension benefits at payout. As the discussion notes, this yields a
quite different outcome than a system that taxes inflows but exempts
payouts, particularly during inflationary times.
Of special interest to pension tax experts is the situation of pension
taxation in New Zealand and Australia, described in some detail. While
both countries recently simplified their tax structure for pensions some-
what, Dilnot still holds that there is no feasible tax system that both raises
revenues and is fiscally neutral. On the other hand, he does point out
that available statistical evidence on the likely effects of taxes on pen-
sion savings suggests that the behavioral responses are likely to be small.
The discussion concludes with a critical analysis of the concept of tax
expenditures, which he concludes makes little sense theoretically or
practically.
In her comments on this chapter, Angela Chang emphasizes that cur-
tailing the favorable tax treatment of pensions may undermine their
contribution to old age saving. She then goes on to outline additional
research questions that require analysis, including the matter of how and
whether to permit pension participants to take lump-sum distributions
from their pensions and, if so, how much to tax them. Sylvester Schieber
sketches exactly how inflation affects real pension returns under dif-
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ferent scenarios and emphasizes that, in the United States at least, gov-
ernment tax policy toward pensions often conflicts directly with the goal
of increasing retirement income.
While policy experts discuss pension taxation, those interested in the
role of pensions in corporate finance emphasize pension funds' invest-
ments, as well as the risks and returns they bring to sponsoring com-
panies.Just how widely these differ across the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations is the subject ofE. Philip
Davis's chapter, seen from his international vantage point at the Euro-
pean Monetary Institute. Davis finds dramatic variability in the ways in
which pensions are financed across the OECD nations, beginning with
different practices as between funded versus pay-as-you-go or unfunded
plans. Looking across a dozen developed nations, he shows that countries
with smaller social security systems tend to have larger private funded
plans, while nations that have "generous" tax provisions have larger pri-
vate funded plans, and that pensions are larger where contracting out is
available.
How pension assets are invested, conditional on there being some sort
of funding, also varies widely across nations. This is in part due to wide-
spread regulation of portfolio composition - as in Japan, where equities
and foreign assets may not exceed a threshold level; in Germany, where
foreign asset holdings are limited to 4 percent and equities held at 20
percent; and in France, where at least 34 percent of mutual societies'
funds for pensions must be deposited in state bonds. These regulations
are apparently quite effective in influencing what pension plans hold: in
Sweden, for instance, pensions held only one percent in equity, but more
than half the funds in mortgages and mortgage-related bonds, while
equity made up over 60 percent of pension holdings in the United King-
dom. Davis documents wide variation in fund performance resulting
from these vastly different holdings.
In his provocative comments on this chapter, Marshall Blume offers
several caveats to Davis's arguments. He questions whether funded plans
can solve the problems with which pay-as-you-go systems cannot cope.
Blume's answer is "perhaps not," particularly if the preferred solution is
to lower pen'sion benefits offered to today's retirees. He goes on to cri-
tique the author's views that unfunded plans crowd out private saving
and that pensions should invest in equities. Based on his own reading of
the data, neither conclusion is persuasive.
Plan termination insurance is the subject of James Pesando's work.
This Canadian economist and long-time pension expert asks why govern-
ments sometimes insure pensions, and comes to the conclusion that no
country has yet determined the economically sensible risk-adjusted pre-
mium needed to pay for this type of bankruptcy coverage. He notes that
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ofll Canadian jurisdictions (10 provinces and the national government)
only one, the Province of Ontario, adopted a form of pension insurance
in 1980, which it is now pulling back from by halting the offering of
inflation-indexed pension coverage. The author also delves into pension
guarantee funds in the United States, Germany, and the United King-
dom, and concludes that these cross-subsidize less profitable firms by
taxing more productive ones. In his view, some of the coverage is associ-
ated with redistribution toward certain firms or industries, rather than
inefficiencies in the market for insurance.
Pesando's chapter is discussed by two commentators who disagree with
each other to a very substantial degree. On the one hand, Dallas Salis-
bury salutes the transfer function of pension insurance mechanisms,
believing as he does that pension insurance can only be operated by the
government precisely because the strong would not be willing voluntarily
to subsidize the weak. On the other hand, Carolyn Weaver believes that
moral hazard makes pension insurance unworkable as insurance, and
notes that few countries have quantified the risk governments carry when
guaranteeing private pension benefits. These problems deserve addi-
tional research, and will certainly receive more debate.
Conclusions
The conceptual framework for understanding cross-national experiences
and policy issues addressed in this book may be summarized by providing
briefanswers to the key questions mentioned at the outset.
What are the roles ofthe government, employers, and individuals in providing
retirement income?
In most developed nations, and increasingly in emerging economies,
the retirement income system can be viewed as a three-legged stool. The
first leg is government-provided pension and welfare programs for the
aged; the second is employer- or labor union-provided pensions, and
the third is individual and family support. This volume demonstrates
substantial variation in the mix of the three sources of retirement in-
come, across households and regions of the world.
One can view a mixed public-private system of retirement income pro-
vision as a way ofreducing the risks ofeach separate component through
diversification across providers. Private sector pension plan sponsors are
committed by law (and perhaps reputation) to pay promised benefits,
but they may default. Public sector pension promises are backed by the
government's taxing authority, but governments sometimes alter benefit
promises by changing the legislated benefit formulas after the fact. As an
24 Pension Security in an Aging World
additional linkage reinforcing the first two legs of the retirement income
stool, there may be government insurance of private pension benefits.
Why do some emplrryers voluntarily sponsorpension plansfor their employees?
Companies find that pensions achieve many useful labor force objec-
tives. Pension plans are an important incentive device in labor contracts,
affecting employee turnover, work effort, and the timing of retirement.
Employers who acquire a reputation for taking care of their employees'
retirement needs may find it easier to recruit and retain higher quality
employees. Workers desire pensions when their companies can help
them tailor their long-run financial plans to their needs, and may find
that employers are more suitable beneficial agents of the employee than
are other potential providers of retirement planning services. Addition-
ally, plan sponsors often have access to capital markets that may be un-
available to employees acting individually, permitting them to insure risks
that are uninsurable privately through group provision.
Which type ofpension plan offers greater security to emplrryees - defined benefit or
defined contribution?
The major advantage of a defined benefit pension is that it offers plan
participants who remain with the same employer a specified benefit de-
signed to replace a portion of their pre-retirement labor income. The
main defect of a private defined benefit plan in most countries is that it
does not usually offer explicit inflation insurance, and benefit payments
are subject to default in the event of corporate bankruptcy. In contrast,
the major advantage of a defined contribution pension is that it offers
participants a more portable and flexible retirement savings vehicle
whose accumulation value prior to retirement is easier to understand and
measure. Hybrid plans, such as cash-balance plans, combine features of
both "pure" pension types.
Why do some emplrryersfund theirdefined benefitpension plans while others do not?
Funding in private plans offers benefit security when there is no gov-
ernment insurance of pension benefits, a factor that is recognized in
some countries by requiring minimum legal funding standards and by
supplying tax incentives for plan sponsors to fund their defined benefit
plans. In public pension plans, funding can offer some protection against
changes in benefit formulas in times of fiscal stress. In addition, funding
a pension plan may provide the sponsor with financial "slack" useful
should the firm face future financial difficulties.
Zvi Bodie and Olivia S. Mitchell 25
What effect does a pension fund's investment policy have on benefit security?
In a defined contribution pension plan, a beneficiary's retirement
income depends directly on the investment performance of the fund
assets, and as with any investment, performance will depend on the as-
sets' risk and expected return patterns. In a defined benefit plan, the
plan sponsor's investment policy can .affect benefit payments if the plan
sponsor defaults with inadequate assets to cover promised benefits and
if there is insufficient government insurance to cover all the resulting
shortfall (i.e., if no government insurance is available, or ifinsured bene-
fits are capped at some level).
What form ofgovernment regulation ofempfqyer-provided pensions is desirable?
In some countries, the government provides explicit insurance against
default risk on private-sector defined benefit pension promises. But
whether or not the government offers pension insurance, there is a case
for government oversight. If a significant part of the private pension
system fails to deliver the benefits promised to millions of people who
had relied on those benefits for their retirement security, governments
are asked to step in to provide at least a minimum old-age income bene-
fit. Thus, even in the absence of a formal system of pension insurance,
governments often become the de facto "guarantor oflast resort."
Notes
'See Friedman (1957) and Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).
"This section draws on Bodie (l990a) and Bodie and Menon (1993).
'See Bodie (1989), Diamond (1977), Kotlikoff (1987), McGill (1977), Merton
(1983), and Wachter (1988).
·Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analyze theoretical models of adverse selection
in an insurance setting. Friedman and Warshawsky (1988) study the private an-
nuities market empirically, and conclude the annuities are priced unattractively
for the average individual.
'This section draws on Bodie (1990a), Gustman and Mitchell (1992), and
Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier (1994).
6For a survey of pension funding practices in various countries, see Bodie
(1990c), Davis (Chapter 8, this volume), and Turner and Dailey (1990).
'Hutchens (1993) discusses problems of job loss and displacement of older
workers; earnings patterns are discussed by Katz and Murphy (1992) ; and Luzadis
and Mitchell (1991) show that defined benefit pension plan formulas have
changed rapidly over time.
"For a further discussion of pension insurance, see Bodie and Menon (1993)
and Pesando (Chapter 9, this volume). For a more general discussion of the role
of the government and private sectors in providing guarantees against default
risk, see Merton and Bodie (1992).
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91ppolito (1986) argues that, when workers are represented by a union, they
accept default risk of the sponsoring firm (through the pension plan) as a way of
binding the union to bargain more cooperatively with management. Under his
assumptions, therefore, a defined benefit plan with default risk is efficient. Pe-
sando (Chapter 9, this volume) offers additional arguments to support this view.
'''The risk exposure is especially large for a lifetime employee of a single firm,
as is quite common in Japan (Watanabe, this volume). Even if the employee is
willing to bear risk, we know from portfolio theory that efficient risk bearing calls
for broad diversification across various firms and asset classes. Here, the em-
ployee's entire pension benefit is tied to the fortunes of a single firm.
"Should employees wish to invest in their company's securities, they often can
do so through a variety of special employee stock ownership programs. These
investment programs are usually voluntary. By contrast, participation in an em-
ployer's defined benefit plan is usually a condition of employment. See Bodie and
Munnell (1992).
'''This section draws heavily on Bodie (1990b, 1991).
"If pension benefits were funded as they accrued, local governments would
have to recognize the cost of providing them in their current budgets. In the past,
promising more pension benefits without funding them was a way for local gov-
ernment to offer increases in compensation without public accountability. The
cost of actually paying the benefits when they came due would then become a
problem for later generations of politicians. This may help explain why there is a
reluctance to fully fund these benefits; see Mitchell and Smith (1994).
References
Ahrend, Peter. "Pension Financial Security in Germany." This volume.
Bodie, Zvi. "Enhancing the Efficiency of Pension Plans." What is the Future Jor
Defined Benefit Pension Plans? ERBI-ERF roundtable. Washington, DC: EBR!,
1989: lOl-IlI.
--. "Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance." Journal ojEconomic Literature
28 (March 1990): 28-49. (1990a).
--. "Managing Pension and Retirement Assets." Journal ojFinancial Services
Research 4 (December 1990): 419-60. (1990b).
--. "Pension Funding Policy in Five Countries." In John Turner and Lorna
Dailey, eds., Pension Policy: An International Perspective, Washington, DC: U.S.
GPO, 1990 (1990c): 59-72.
--. "Shortfall Risk and Pension Asset Allocation." Financial AnalystsJournal 47,
3 (May/June 1991): 57-61.
Bodie, Zvi,Jay 0. Light, Randall Morek, and Robert A. Taggart, Jr. "Funding and
Asset Allocation in Corporate Pension Plans: An Empirical Investigation." In
Zvi Bodie,John Shoven, and David Wise, eds., Issues in Pension Economics. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1987: 15-44.
Bodie, Zvi and Robert C. Merton. "Pension Benefit Guarantees in the United
States: A Functional Analysis." In Ray Schmitt, ed., The Future ojPensions in the
United States. Philadelphia: Pension Research Council and University of Penn-
sylvania Press, 1993: 194-246.
Bodie, Zvi and Alicia Munnell, eds. Pensions and the Economy: Sources, Uses, and
Limitations ofData. Philadelphia: Pension Research Council and University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1992.
Zvi Bodle and Olivia S. Mitchell 27
Clark, Robert L. "Inflation Protection ofRetiree Benefits." InJohn A. Turner and
Lorna Dailey, eds., Pension Policy: An International Perspective. Washington, DC:
U.S. GPO, 1990: 53-58.
Davis, E. Philip. "An International Comparison of the Financing of Occupational
Pensions." This volume.
Daykin, Christopher D. "Occupational Pension Provision in the United King-
dom." This volume.
Diamond, Peter A. "A Framework for Social Security Analysis." Journal ofPublic
Economics 8 (1977): 275-98.
--. "Privatization of Social Security: Lessons from Chile." NBER Working
Paper 4510, October 1993.
Dilnot, Andrew. "The Taxation of Private Pensions." This volume.
Friedman, B. M. and Marc Warshawsky. "Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in
the United States." In Zvi Bodie,John Shoven, and David Wise, eds., Pensions in
the U.S. Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988: 53-84.
Friedman, Martin. A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University.
Gustman, Alan and Olivia S. Mitchell. "Pensions and Labor Market Activity." In
Zvi Bodie and Alicia Munnell, eds., Pensions and the Economy: Sources, Uses, and
Limitations ofData. Philadelphia: Pension Research Council and University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1992: 39-113.
Gustman, Alan S., Olivia S. Mitchell, and Thomas Steinmeier. "The Role of Pen-
sions in the Labor Market." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 47, 3 (1994):
417-438.
Gustman, Alan S. and Thomas Steinmeier. "Cost of Living Adjustments in Pen-
sions." In Olivia Mitchell, ed., As the Workforce Ages: Costs, Benefits and Policy
Challenges. Ithaca, NY: lLR Press, 1993: 147-180.
Hutchens, Robert. "Restricted Job Opportunities and the Older Worker." In
Olivia Mitchell, ed., As the Workforce Ages: Costs, Benefits and Policy Challenges.
Ithaca, NY: ILRPress, 1993: 81-102.
Ippolito, Richard A. Pensions, Economics and Public Policy. Homewood, IL: Pension
Research Council and DowJones-Irwin, 1986.
--. The Economics ofPension Insurance. Homewood, lL: Pension Research Coun-
cil and Richard D. Irwin, 1989.
James, Estelle and Dmitri Vittas. "Mandatory Savings Schemes: Are They an An-
swer to the Old Age Security Problem?" This volume.
Katz, Lawrence and Kevin Murphy. "Changes in Relative Wages: Supply and
Demand Factors." Q!.tarterlyJournal ofEconomics 46 (October 1992): 35-78.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. "JustifYing Public Provision of Social Security." Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management 6, 4 (1987): 674-696.
Luzadis, Rebecca and Olivia S. Mitchell. "Explaining Pension Dynamics." Journal
ofHuman Resources 26 (Fall 1991): 679-703.
McGill, Dan M., ed. Social Security and Private Pensions: Competitive or Complementary.
Homewood, IL.: Pension Research Council and Richard D. Irwin.
Merton, Robert C. "On Consumption-Indexed Public Pension Plans." In Zvi
Bodie and John Shoven, eds., Financial Aspects of the U.S. Pension System. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Merton, Robert C. and Zvi Bodie. "On the Management of Financial Guaran-
tees." Financial Managenzent 21, 4 (Winter 1992): 87-109.
Merton, Robert c., Zvi Bodie, and Alan Marcus. "Pension Plan Integration as
Insurance Against Social Security Risk." In Zvi Bodie,John Shoven, and David
28 Pension Security In an Aging World
Wise, eds., Issues in Pension Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987: 147-172.
Mitchell, Olivia S. "Retirement Systems in the Developed and Developing World:
Institutional Structure, Economic Effects, and Lessons for Economies in Tran-
sition." In Avril Van Adams, Elizabeth King, and Zafiris Tzannatos, eds., Labor
Market Policies for Managing the Social Cost ofEconomic Adjustment. Washington,
DC: World Bank, forthcoming.
Mitchell, Olivia S. and Robert S. Smith. "Pension Funding in the Private Sector."
Review ofEconomics and Statistics (May 1994): 278-290.
Modigliani, Franco and Richard Brumberg. "Utility Analysis and the Consump-
tion Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data." In Kenneth K Kuri-
hara, ed., Post-Keynesian Economics. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1954: 388-436.
Myers, Robert]. "Concepts of Balance Between OASDI and Private Pension Ben-
efits." In Dan McGill, ed., Social Security and Private Pension Plans: Competitive or
Complementary? Homewood, IL: Pension Research Council and Richard D. Ir-
win, 1977: 94-109.
--. "Chile's Social Security Reform After Ten Years." Benefits QJ-larterly 1
(Third Quarter 1992): 41-55.
--. Social Security. Fourth edition. Philadelphia: Pension Research Council and
University'ofPennsylvania Press, 1993.
Pesando, James E. "The Government's Role in Insuring Pensions." This volume.
Rothschild, Michael and]. E. Stiglitz. "Equilibrium and Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information." QJ-larterly
Journal ofEconomics 90 (1976): 629-650.
Turner, John A. and Lorna M. Dailey, eds. Pension Policy: An International Perspec-
tive. Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 1990.
Turner, John A. and David M. Rajnes. "Private Pension Systems in Eastern Eu-
rope." This volume.
Utgoff, Kathleen P. "The PBGC: A Costly Lesson in the Economics of Federal
Insurance." In M. S. Sniderman, ed., Government Risk-Bearing. Cleveland, OH:
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 1992.
Wachter, S. Social Security and Private Pensions. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1988.
Watanabe, Noriyasu. "Private Pension Plans inJapan." This volume.
Glossary ofTerms
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Pension plans are classified into two types: defined contribution (DC)
and defined benefit (DB). As the names suggest, in a DC plan a formula
determines contributions (e.g., 10 percent of annual wages), whereas in
a DB plan a formula defines benefits (e.g., one percent of final pay per
year of service). In a defined contribution plan, the employee receives at
retirement a benefit whose size depends on the accumulated value of the
funds in the retirement account. The employee bears all the investment
risk, and the plan sponsor has no obligation beyond making its periodic
contribution. In a defined benefit plan the plan sponsor or an insurance
company guarantees the formula benefits and thus absorbs the invest-
ment risk. In some countries governments insure a portion of defined
benefit pension promises in the event of corporate sponsor bankruptcy;
defined contribution benefits are not, however, insured by governments.
Pension Funding
With defined benefit plans, there is an important distinction between the
pension plan and the pension fund. The plan is the contractual arrange-
ment setting out the rights and obligations of all parties; the fund is a
separate pool of assets set aside in a trust to provide collateral for the
promised benefits. In defined contribution plans, the value of the bene-
fits and the assets are equal by definition, so the plan is always exactly fully
funded. But in defined benefit plans there need not be a separate fund,
in which case the plan is said to be unfunded. In an unfunded plan, the
sponsor's own assets back the pension claims.
Vesting and Portability
Employees are vested in their pension plan if they retain their pension
benefits even if they stop working for the employer sponsoring the pen-
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sion plan. Vested benefits are not necessarily portable, where portability
refers to the ability of a vested worker to take pension benefits from one
employer to another. In the United States, employees who have accrued
benefits under one employer's defined benefit plan usually cannot trans-
fer those accruals to another employer, even if they are vested. The result
is that benefits of employees who change jobs are not protected against
inflation. In the United Kingdom, occupational pensions permit greater
portability.
Pension Indexing
There are two types of indexing: market indexing and inflation indexing.
Market indexing consists of managing an investment portfolio so as to
match the performance of some broad market index of stocks, bonds, or
a combination of both. Inflation indexing consists of tying benefits to an
index of the cost of living. Market indexing became a common invest-
ment strategy of pension funds during the 1980s in the United States, but
automatic inflation indexing of private pensions is still rare.
